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This paper estimates what characteristics (e.g. location, number of casualties, and type of 
attack) are associated with an Islamic terrorist attack. This is established by identifying the 
significant determinants of the probability that an attack had been carried out by Islamic 
terrorists. For Europe, the United States, and Canada, the analysis employs ITERATE data 
from October 1979 to December 2002 to ascertain the significant characteristics of Islamic 
terrorist attacks. A random-parameter logit model is used to analyze the probability of such 
attacks, taking into account the heterogeneity of the sample data. This model outperforms the 
standard logit model. Some policy implications are presented. 
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Western societies in the early years of the twenty-first century must confront complex 
and multi-dimensional social, political, economic and cultural factors, which require 
extensive research in various disciplines, if they are to approach an understanding of why 
radical Islamic terrorism has proliferated across the world. The growth trend in radical 
Islamic terrorism, which reached an unprecedented scale on September 11 2001, more or less 
coincides with the dwindling of Communist state-sponsored and other leftist terrorism. 
Radical Islamic terrorism is, in its aim, similar to the terrorism which was common in Europe 
during the 1970s, in as much as one of its goals is the destruction of the capitalist system 
(Richards, 2003). The evolutionary pattern means that there is a variation in the acts of 
terrorism along the time, whilst under the definition of terrorist events, there are different 
types of political demands (Donno and Russett, 2004). 
 The research presented in this paper analyzes the characteristics of radical Islamic 
acts of terrorism in European countries, the United States and Canada between October 1979 
and December 2002. The motivation for this research stems from three critical issues 
associated with radical Islamic terrorism: first, the unprecedented nature of the radical 
Islamic terrorist attacks that befell New York City and Washington DC on 11 September 
2001(employing civil airliners as weapons of mass destruction)  and Madrid on March 11 
2004 (bombing rush-hour commuter trains); second, the consequent scale of victimization 
achievable and achieved by such methods, combined with the threat of obtaining and using 
methods that would wreak even greater indiscriminate carnage on civilian populations;  and 
lastly, the escalating dangers of the social, economic, political and even psychological 
impacts on the continuing viability of the capitalist system and way of life, implied by the 
failure to prevent such attacks.  
The paper contributes to the theme’s literature in five ways. First, it uses the random-
parameters logit model (RPL), previously used by Train (1998) and Revelt and Train (1998), 
which allows for heterogeneity in the data set. Second, it specifically analyzes radical Islamic 
terrorist events, an issue that so far has not inspired much research in Europe, despite its 
contemporary importance. Third, it analyzes terrorist events on both sides of the Atlantic, 
which are tied by the same market system as well as the same threat. Fourth, it uses panel 
data, whereas time-series analysis is usually used. Lastly, it investigates the targeting of 
United States citizens outside the USA, a phenomenon linked to Islamic terrorism, and which 
has not attracted research so far. 
  2The paper regresses the probability of a terrorist attack being perpetrated by an 
extremist Islamic organization on its characteristics, using a mixed logit. The model permits 
the identification of significant statistical characteristics that estimate the probability of a 
terrorist attack to be Islamic, as opposed to a non-Islamic.  The value of such research is that 
it could contribute to policy formulation in the war against terrorism. If one knew the 
characteristics identifying Islamic events, then one could better allocate resources used in 
countering such events. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the second section, we briefly describe the 
contextual setting and its antecedents; in section 3, the existing literature is surveyed; in 
section 4, we present the mixed logit model; in section 5, we present the theoretical 
framework; in section 6, the data is set out and the results presented; and finally, in section 7, 
we give our conclusions. 
 
2. TERRORISM IN EUROPE, THE USA AND CANADA 
The character and motivation of the first terrorist groups to emerge in the Middle East 
in the late-1960s were political, rather than religious; that is, Marxist, anti-western and anti-
capitalist. They were secular, revolutionary movements, a minority of the tendency 
proliferating amongst young, extreme left-wing intellectuals and the disaffected globally, 
against the background of ideological conflict and confrontation of the Cold War, most 
ostensibly present in the US involvement in Vietnam. They found sponsorship in states such 
as the Soviet Union and certain Arab countries.  Radical Palestinians began to 
internationalize and urbanize their conflict with aerial hijackings, kidnappings, bombings and 
assassinations, involving western civilians for the first time.  
Two major events of 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, were to determine, in the short and long terms, an evolution from secularist, 
politically-motivated terrorism towards the radical Islamic form. The assassination by 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood of President Anwar Sadat in Cairo in October 1981 
brought to the world’s attention the extent of developing militant Islamic radicalism.  
Turning now to the acts of terrorism themselves, Table 1 below presents the aggregate 
characteristics of terrorism events from October 1979 to December 2002. Our sample covers 
the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France (including 
Corsica), Germany (including the former German Democratic Republic), Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy (including the Vatican), Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
  3Switzerland, the UK (including Northern Ireland) and the USA. Besides these countries, we 
have considered also a residual category named ‘Other European Countries’.  
 










Equality in means t 
test 
       t-stat  p-value 
Terrorist Events  2799 386 2413  
Armed Attack  163 21 142 -0,355  0,72
Arson 389 8 381 -13,2088  0,00
Assassination 249 75 174 5,863  0,00
Bomb 1068 102 966 -5,535  0,00
Kidnap 35 4 31 -0,440  0,66
Letter bomb  65 7 58 -0,789  0,43
Skyjacking 74 11 63 0,263  0,79
Wounded 7157 3818 3339 1,438  0,15
Killed 4092 3528 564 1,223  0,22
US victims Outside USA  1076 584 492 0,169  0,87
 
Radical Islamic terrorist attacks constitute 13.8% of all terrorist events. The most 
common type of terrorist method is explosive bombs, followed by arson (which also includes 
incendiary bombing and Molotov cocktails), assassination and armed attacks. Letter or parcel 
bombing and aerial hijacks are less common. Islamic terrorists reveal a different hierarchy of 
preferences for the type of the attack, with assassination the second favorite method, followed 
by armed attack and arson (in this order). Despite the fact that the use of bombs is their most 
favored type of attack, they resort much less to it than non-Islamic terrorists. The same table 
includes the result of a t-test for the equalities in the means in terms of the different 
characteristics of Islamic attacks relative to non-Islamic attacks. The results show that Islamic 
groups resort significantly less to bombs and arson and significantly more to assassination 
than non-Islamic groups. For the other characteristics, there are no significant differences in 
the mean. 
The average casualties (wounded plus killed) resulting from an Islamic extremist 
attack for the entire period under analysis are much higher than those from a non-Islamic 
attack, but this value is greatly influenced by the extremely high number of casualties in the 
September 11 events. Considering the average number of casualties before 2000, the 
difference between Islamic and Non-Islamic terrorist events is not so significant, with an 
average of 4.1 for the former and 1.7 for the latter.  Moreover, for the whole period, the 
  4results of the t-test cannot detect significant differences between the mean numbers of 
wounded and killed in Islamic attacks and those in non-Islamic attacks. 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Terrorist Events by country: October 1979 to December 2002 
Variables Austria  Belgium  Canada  Denmark  France  Germany  Greece  Ireland 
Terrorist Events  59  66  26  26  428  542  282  28 
Radical Islamic   16  11  4  4  84  46  39  0 
% of Rad. Islamic  27.1  16.7  15.4  15.4  19.6  8.5  13.8  0.0 
Armed Attack  4  5  0  3  23  47  23  1 
Arson 4  4  0  2  20  122  53  4 
Assassination 9  5  5  1  48  30  26  1 
Bomb 19  24  1  8  217  114  137  9 
Kidnap  0 2  0 1  6 2  1  4 
Letter  bomb  2 1  0 1  5 5  1  0 
Skyjacking 0  0  0  0  7  12  3  0 
Wounded 84  137  52  31  1037  877  400  6 
Killed 17  16  5  2  137  80  57  2 
US victims  6  4  0  4  48  232  173  1 
Variables Italy  Netherl.  Portugal Spain Sweden  Switzer.  UK  USA 
Terrorist Events  198  45  56  216  38  58  395  312 
Radical Islamic   49  11  3  23  9  16  34  35 
% of Rad. Islamic  24.7  24.4  5.4  10.6  23.7  27.6  8.6  11.2 
Armed Attack  11  0  7  12  3  4  10  9 
Arson 20  3  0  16  2  5  103  28 
Assassination 27  6  4  18  2  8  23  29 
Bomb 75  14  34  123  3  20  164  102 
Kidnap  3 1  0 5  1 1  4  4 
Letter  bomb  0 1  1 6  2 0  24  16 
Skyjacking  5 0  0 6  5 2  5  22 
Wounded 566  12  10  212  6  97  1190  2434 
Killed 157  14  12  48  4  9  417  3115 
US victims  116  2  2  73  1  7  401  5677 
Obs: The percentage of Radical Islamic attacks refers to the total number of attacks in the country 
 
  5Table 2 presents the results of terrorist events by country examined. Radical Islamic 
terrorism is a representative phenomenon among terrorist incidents of all origins in most of 
the countries analyzed, with France, Italy and Germany displaying the highest number of 
radical Islamic terrorist incidents, followed by Greece, the UK, the USA , Spain and 
Switerland, in that order. However, Switzerland has the highest rate of this type of incidents, 
maybe because it hosts various international institutions and frequent international meetings 
and conferences, which may constitute priority targets for radical Islamic terrorists. Portugal 
has the lowest rate of Islamic attacks. When we restrict the analysis to the last three years 
(2000-2002), the rate of radical Islamic terrorism for the USA increases dramatically to 67%, 
corresponding to 6 events out of the total of 9. This pattern is also registered by Italy, where 
the proportion of Islamic terrorism increases to 83%, but this figure should be analyzed with 
caution in view of the small number of terrorist events occurring in this country during the 
period analyzed. Other countries display some or no terrorist events at all in the same period.  
The total number of US victims varies from country to country, as does the number of 
wounded and killed. The UK, Greece, Italy and Germany display the highest averages of US 
victims in foreign countries: 1.02, 0.61, 0.59 and 0.43 respectively, while the USA, the UK, 
Italy and France are the countries with the highest average casualties. The high rate of US 
victims in the UK can be explained by the Pan Am Flight 103 incident in December 1988, 
resulting in a total of 270 deaths. However, the average casualties in the USA before 2000 
drops considerably to 0.45, being one of the smallest figures observed. Portugal, Spain, 
France and Greece have the highest percentage of terrorist attacks using bombs, 61%, 57%, 
51% and 49% respectively, while the UK, Germany and Greece are the countries in which 
the rate of the arson type of attacks is greatest, 26.1%, 22.5% and 18.9% respectively. 
Assassination has a higher share in Canada, Belgium and Austria, with rates of 19.2%, 18.1% 
and 15.3% respectively.  
 
3. LITERATURE SURVEY 
The economics literature on terrorism is restricted both in terms of the number of papers and 
the number of authors (for a relatively up-to-date survey, see Enders and Sandler, 1995).  
Two main types of analyses are in evidence: time series models and cross-section or panel 
data models. Papers in the time series tradition use intervention analysis, in which the number 
of terrorist incidents is regressed on indicators of policy intervention, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of policy (Enders and Sandler, 1993). Alternatively, time series models use 
  6economic-impact analysis, in which the foreign direct investment is regressed on terrorist 
incidents to evaluate the economic impact of terrorism on the economic variables (Enders and 
Sandler, 1996). Enders and Sandler (1991) used a VAR (vector auto-regression) first-order to 
estimate the economic impact of terrorism on tourism in Spain during the period from 1970 
to 1988. Enders (1995, pp. 316-320) presents a pedagogical review of the previous paper. 
Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992) analyzed the economic impact of terrorism on tourism 
receipts, using quarterly data for 12 countries from 1970:I to 1988:IV with a transfer 
function.  Enders and Sandler (1996) analyzed the economic impact of terrorist actions on 
foreign direct investment in Spain and Greece with quarterly data from 1975:I to 1991:IV for 
Spain and 1976:I to 1991:IV for Greece. They concluded that an average year of terrorism led 
to a persistent, negative impact on foreign direct investment of 13.5% for Spain. For Greece, 
this annual negative impact on foreign direct investment was 11.9%. Drakos and Kutan 
(2003) analyzed the impact of terrorism in three countries: Greece, Turkey and Israel, with a 
simultaneous equation model, concluding that the tourism industry is sensitive to terrorist 
attacks. Sloboda (2003) assessed the effects of terrorism on tourism with yearly data from 
1988 to 2001 for the USA by an ARMAX model, allowing for a trend and unit roots in the 
data. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) analyzed the economic impact of ETA terrorism on 
GDP, concluding that there was a 10% average gap between per-capita GDP in the Basque 
Country and the per-capita GDP of a comparable synthetic region that does not suffer from 
terrorism. Moreover, on analyzing Basque market-listed companies in comparison with non-
Basque listed companies, they concluded that the former show a negative performance as an 
externality of terrorism. 
Time series analysis is also used to analyze generic characteristics of terrorist attacks. 
Enders and Sandler (2002) analyzed the pattern of transnational terrorism with a Fourrier 
model. Another paper employs time-series data with the aim of forecasting the future 
evolution of terrorist incidents (Enders and Sandler, 2002).  
Papers employing cross-section and panel data are less common and include Atkinson 
et al. (1987), who examined the impact of changes in the negotiating environment on the 
length and severity of terrorist attacks and Li and Schaub (2004), who analyze the 
relationship between economic globalization and transnational terrorism, using a negative 
binomial regression for a sample of 112 countries from 1975 to 1997. Blomberg et al. (2002) 
analyze the importance of standard economic variables such as per-capita GDP growth and 
investment in determining the onset and intensity of terrorist attacks for a sample of 127 
countries from 1968 to 1991, using a Markov model.  
  7From this literature survey, we can observe that the results are focused on the 
implications of terrorism on specific economic variables. Concerning the econometric 
methodology employed, time-series dynamics and related issues, such as causality tests and 
trend breaks on terrorism events, are well understood. However, heterogeneity in the 
observed variable, spatial dispersion of the data and other issues related to cross-section data 
on terrorist attacks are less understood. In this paper, we enlarge on previous research by 
seeking the determinants of the likelihood of an Islamic attack, allowing for the heterogeneity 
inherent in the terrorist behavior and investigating the particular dispersion of the attacks by 
country. As far as we know, no other paper has estimated either the determinants of Islamic 
terrorist attacks, or the heterogeneity in terrorism variables.     
 
4. MIXED LOGIT 
With the characteristics of an attack denoted by the vector  , the probability that the attack 
with characteristics   was instigated by Islamic terrorists as opposed to non-Islamic 
terrorists is denoted by 
i x
i x
) , ( i x P β  with β  a vector of unknown parameters. This probability is 















) , (  (1) 
The logit is a highly popular model with regard to dealing with binary outcomes. 
Mcfadden (1974), Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Train (1986) used the logit model to 
relate the probability of making a choice to a set of variables reflecting decision-maker 
preferences. The logit is usually used as a behavioral model.  In the present paper, we use the 
model in a slightly different approach, which is statistical, rather than behavioral. We 
estimate the probability of a terrorist event being carried out by an Islamic terrorist group, 
given a set of characteristics of the event, that is, we estimate Prob(Islamic⎪type), where type 
includes the particular attributes of the event. A behavioral approach to this problem would 
be Prob (type ⎪Islamic), but the data set used does not allow for the estimation of such a 
model. 
An alternative model is the random parameters logit (RPL) (also called mixed logit), 
which relaxes the assumption that the coefficients are the same for all terrorist events, 
allowing for some heterogeneity in the way the attack’s characteristics determine the 
probability of it being carried out by an Islamic group.  Therefore, this model is more flexible 
  8than the standard logit and tests can be applied to determine whether this extra flexibility is 
needed in order to fit the data.  
For the RPL model, an event i’s coefficient on some characteristic j, , ji β  is a random 
draw from some distribution where the family of the distribution is specified, but the mean 
and variance are unknown and have to be estimated. We consider  i i η µ β + ≡  with 
) , 0 ( ~ Ω F i η , independent of εi.  When ) (• F  is symmetric, it is usually considered to be the 
normal, and less often, the uniform or triangular distribution. If, for example, the coefficient 
can only assume positive values with asymmetric distribution,  ) (• F is usually lognormal. The 
RPL probability of a radical Islamic terrorist attack is the integral of the standard logit 





−∞ Ω = β µ β β d f x P P i i ) , | ( ) , ( ... .   (2) 
The model estimates the coefficients mean,µ , and the covariance between them,Ω. 
Exact maximum-likelihood estimation is not possible, since the integral cannot be calculated 
analytically and requires simulation. Recently developed techniques for simulating 
probabilities (Train, 2003) have made it feasible to estimate such models. Applications 
include Train (1998), Revelt and Train (1998), Mcfadden and Train (2000) and Rouwendal 
and Meijer (2001). Observe that Pi is the expectation of, ) , ( i x P β  so that it can be calculated 
by summing over R simulated  ) , ( i i x P β  with  i β drawn from ) , | ( Ω µ β F . These draws can be 
obtained randomly using a pseudo-random generator but more recently, systematic methods, 
such as Halton draws, have proved to be more efficient (see Train (2003) for further details). 













β , (3) 
where is the
r
i β i β  from the rth draw from  ), , | ( Ω µ β F for event i and R is the number of 
draws. Thus the simulated log-likelihood function for the RPL is: 
() ∑ ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣








y SP y SP SL
1
1 1 log , (4) 
which depends on µ and Ω. The maximum- likelihood estimates of those parameters (given 
their chosen initial values) are obtained with iterative numerical optimization procedures (see 
Train (2003) and Hensher and Greene (2003) for further explanations). Additionally, we 
remark that the mixed logit allows for heteroskedasticity in the error term, depending on the 
explanatory variables. Therefore we conclude that the mixed logit is more flexible than 
  9standard logit, and tests can be applied to determine whether the extra flexibility is needed for 
fitting the data. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this paper, we estimate a mixed logit model to analyze the determinants of radical 
Islamic terrorism in Europe, the USA and Canada for October 1979 to December 2002. The 
choice of countries is based on the observed emigration from Islamic countries to the 
industrialized western nations (Clutterbuck 1975). We estimate the probability of a terrorist 
attack with certain characteristics, which define the type of attack, being perpetrated by an 
Islamic group, that is, Prob (Islamic⎪type). As mentioned earlier, this is a statistical, rather 
than a behavioral model. Behavioral models are not adequate in the present framework and 
are beyond the scope of this paper. We therefore use no motivational variables, rather relying 
on a statistical model that fits the probability of Islamic terrorist actions, given their particular 
attributes. 
We adopt the definition of Enders and Sandler (2004): " terrorism is the premeditated 
use or threat of use of violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or 
social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate 
victims".  On the basis of this definition, we estimate the above-mentioned probability for 
event i as,  
∫ ∞ +
∞ − = 5 5 5 5 ) , | ( ) , ( ) | Pr( β σ µ β β d N v P v Islamic i i i   (5) 
with   the normal distribution, and  ) (• N
. 12 11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
it it it i i i
i i i i i i i i
US UK Switz Ital Ger Fran
USvicsout cas bomb arson armed assass v
β β β β β β
β β β β β β β
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
 (6) 
We chose the variables from the ITERATE data set, on the basis of their availability. 
Here Islamic is a dummy variable, equal to one whenever the attack was performed by radical 
Islamic terrorists. ITERATE does not specify radical Islamic attacks, but identifies the first 
group initiating the action. From the list, we have chosen the Islamic groups. Some of this 
plethora of Islamic groups may not be radical in their nature, but since we are considering 
terrorism in Europe, the USA and Canada, we assume that almost all Islamic groups 
perpetrating terrorist attacks in the western countries are radical. We have excluded, for 
instance, the PKK (Kurdish People’s Liberation Front), in view of its well- known secular 
nature. In the Appendix to this paper, we include the list of the groups appearing in our data 
  10that we consider to be radical Islamic. There are some terrorist events in the ITERATE data 
set committed by unknown groups (24%). In such cases, we have considered these terrorist 
events to be non-Islamic, since they are more probable than the Islamic. However, this 
procedure may introduce some contamination into the model.  
Armed, Arson, Assass, and Bomb are dummy variables based on ITERATE’s 
identification of types of incident, which accounts for 25 types of terrorist actions, from 
which we selected the most common. We considered armed attacks (Armed), including armed 
attack employing missiles, armed attacks--other, including mortars, bazookas, and shoot-outs 
with the police;  incendiary bombing, arson and Molotov cocktails (Arson); assassination 
(Assass); bombing (bomb) which includes explosive bombing and car bombing; kidnapping; 
letter- or parcel-bombing; and aerial hijacking. Suicide attacks have not been considered 
because there were only 4 in the sample, i.e. those accounting for the September 11 attacks. 
Some types have been dropped from the model, due to their statistical insignificance in a 
previous analysis.  
Casualties is a continuous variable which results from adding together wounded and 
killed, identified by ITERATE respectively as the number of individuals wounded and the 
number of individuals killed. These two variables are highly correlated (with correlation 
coefficient equal to 0.97), so that when we introduced both into the model, only wounded is 
statistically significant. Therefore, we decided to combine the information of both variables 
by considering the number of casualties instead. We have also considered the number of US 
citizen victims outside the USA (US vics out US), in order to take into account the targeting 
of the USA claimed by radical Islamic terrorist groups.  
Fran, Ital, Ger, Switz, UK and US  are dummy variables representing the country 
where the event took place, based on ITERATE’s identification of the end location of the 
terrorist event. ITERATE identifies the starting and ending locations. For roughly 98% of the 
events, the starting and ending location of a particular event are identical. Differences in 
starting and ending locations result from hijacking, which was not statistically significant in 
the previous analysis and therefore, is not an explanatory variable in our model. In a previous 
analysis, we also considered Spain, but in all of the models that we applied, this was not a 
statistically significant variable. The chosen countries are based on their being considered as 
representative of western society in terms of dimension and political involvement in 
international affairs. Furthermore, these are the western countries, except for Greece, with a 
higher annual average incidence of terrorism events in the period (Blomberg et. al., 2002). 
Switzerland was included due to its high rate of Islamic terrorist attacks.  
  11Intervention variables were not taken into account, because it is not clear what these 
are for this type of event. The relative level of terrorist activities depends on three factors: 
The relative costs between legal and illegal activities, the relative gains between the two 
types of activities, and the total resources available. Efforts to curb the funding of radical 
Islamic terrorist groups are not documented, thus preventing the definition of this variable. 
Other traditional intervention variables, such as the introduction of metal detectors in airports, 
are not specific to this type of terrorism and merely cause substitution among various modes 
of operation (Enders and Sandler, 1993). The main modes of intervention deployed against 
radical Islamic groups are preemption and deterrence, applied through the intelligence and 
security agencies, together with the usual procedures applied to counter organized crime. A 
further reason for not considering additional variables is because the ITERATE data set is 
established on a daily basis and consequently, will display very small variations within this 
type of sample. The above-mentioned potentially exogenous variables are not available on 
this basis. If we aggregated the data set to introduce additional variables, we would then have 
count data of radical Islamic events, which would preclude the use of the mixed logit model. 
The non-consideration of preemption and deterrence variables may induce the omitted 
variable bias in our model, if these politics have determinant different consequences on 
Islamic terrorists opposed to non-Islamic. On the other hand, preemption and deterrence may 
influence mainly the type of attack, and therefore, indirectly, they are considered in the 
model.  
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Time series data on terrorist incidents is found in the ITERATE data base from 1968 
to 2002, available from Mickolus (edwardmickolus@hotmail.com). We restricted the data 
span to the period October 1979 to December 2002. The initial data frame is based on Enders 
and Sandler (2000), who established that the rise of fundamentalist terrorism started in the 
fourth quarter of 1979. The final period is defined by the availability of the data.  We 
gathered a total of 2,799 observations. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the data. 
We verify that most of the data set comprises dummy variables, with two continuous 
variables: casualties and US victims out of US. 
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To estimate the mixed logit model, we used a simulator for RPL on the Gauss 
programming language, available in Kenneth Train’s home page
2. Other results were 
obtained with TSP. 
We present a standard logit model and the mixed model for comparative purposes.  
As we have previously mentioned, Spain was not statistically significant in any of the 
models used, thus it was eliminated from our analysis. Focusing on the adequacy of the 
standard logit model, we implemented the RESET test. The result gives evidence of mis-
specification of the logit model. This may be due to the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, depending on the aforementioned explanatory variables. We applied the HAL 
test of Chesher and Santos-Silva (2002), using likelihood ratio procedures to test against this 
type of heterogeneity. First, we considered that it was dependent on all the explanatory 
                                                           
2  http:/elsa.berkeley.edu/~train/Ps.html. 
  13variables. Next, we applied a classic selection procedure. The results display evidence of 
unobserved heterogeneity depending on Bomb,  Casualties, and Switzerland,  inducing the 
estimation of a mixed logit with random coefficients for these variables.  However, the 
hypothesis that Bomb  and  Switzerland have a random coefficient was rejected and 
consequently, we considered Casualties to be the only source of random effects.  The final 
results can be seen in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Parameter estimates and t-statistics  
  Standard Logit  Mixed Logit 
Variables Coefficients  t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Intercept -1.3417 -11.09 -1.3386  -10.07 
Armed Attack  -0.5789 -2.28 -0.8425  -2.63 
Arson -2.3295 -6.31 -2.4151  -6.03 
Assassination 0.4533 2.74 0.6371  2.68 
Bomb -1.0542 -7.45 -1.3832  -8.04 
Casualties 0.0157 3.92 -0.4471  -1.58 
US vics out US  0.0299 1.75 0.0307  1.14 
France 0.3749 2.32 0.3574  1.86 
Germany -0.6297 -3.31 -0.7436  -3.51 
Italy 0.5943 2.96 0.7303  3.17 
Switzerland 0.7496 2.32 0.9308  2.67 
UK -0.4389 -2.03 -0.5242  -2.01 
USA -0.4673 -2.19 -0.5749  -2.40 
Random Effects    
Casualties 1.2065  2.65 
Observations 2799 2799   
LogLikelihood -1002.02 -982.41   
Specification tests:  Statistic p-val.   
RESET on stand. Logit  -2.579 0.01    
HAL  on standard Logit  20.379 0.000    
LR: standard vs Mixed  39.22 0.000    
RESET: Detects misspecification in the logit model and was performed with  ; 
2 ˆ
i x β′
HAL: Detects evidence of heterogeneity in the logit model depending on Bombing, casualties and 
Switzerland. 
LR: Likelihood ratio test 
 
Taking into account the mixed logit, the probability of an attack being Islamic 
increases if the attack results in assassination. Furthermore, terrorist attacks taking place in 
France, Italy and Switzerland have a higher probability of being Islamic, whereas for those in 
the UK and the USA, this does not appear to be the case.  On the other hand, attacks that are 
armed, or involve bombs or arson have a lower probability of being Islamic. While the 
number of US victims and the number of resulting casualties were statistically significant for 
the standard logit, for the mixed model they were not. Nevertheless, we can not reject the 
possibility that casualties has a random coefficient (with estimated standard deviation equal 
  14to 1.21), neither can we reject the possibility that the average of the coefficients in the 
population is zero. This signifies that for half of the events, the coefficient is positive and for 
the other half, it is negative. 
Comparing the standard logit with the respective mixed logit by means of an LR test, 
we obtain a test statistic with p-values equal to 0.00, denoting that the mixed logit is the more 
appropriate specification.  
The fact that a parameter is random, opposed to non-random means that the effect of 
this variable has a widespread variance, signifying that it varies greatly along the sample. 
Therefore, there are terrorist events with few casualties that have a high probability of being 
Islamic and an equally high probability of this origin for others with many casualties. 
Confronted with this result, the non-random results are more predictable, and when it is said 
that the UK has a negative probability of experiencing a radical Islamic attack, this signifies 
that Islamic terrorist acts are less likely to happen in the UK, due to deterrence enforcement, 
or because Islamic terrorists do not target this country systematically.  
The general picture is in accordance with the perception obtained from the media. The 
UK and the USA are not preferred targets of radical Islamic terrorism.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have estimated the probability of terrorist attacks being of a radical Islamic 
origin, given the attributes of the attack, for countries in Europe, the USA and Canada, using 
a mixed logit model and data referring to terrorist events for the period October 1979 to 
December 2002, obtained from the ITERATE data set. Taking into account the mixed logit, 
we conclude, first, that spatial heterogeneity related to Islamic terrorist attacks exists among 
countries analyzed, with such attacks being more prevalent in Switzerland, France and Italy 
and less prevalent in Germany, the UK and the USA. Second, attacks that result in 
assassination have a higher probability of being Islamic, while those resorting to bombs, 
arson, or armed attacks reduce this probability. Finally, we conclude that heterogeneity exists 
in the variable the number of casualties.  
These results characterize the probability of terrorist attacks being Islamic as a 
function of the target country and the type of attack: What is the appropriate policy in this 
context? First, Switzerland, France and Italy should allocate more funds to counteract this 
type of terrorism. Second, the prevention and deterrence policies should take into account the 
evidence that, contrary to the Al Qaeda attacks, conventional Islamic attacks in Europe and 
  15North America rely more on assassination and less on bombs, arson or armed attacks. Policy-
makers and enforcers should also be aware that Islamic terrorists may cause more US victims 
outside the USA, though the statistical insignificance of the parameter of this variable when 
heterogeneity is taken into account (possibly due to a lack of precision) induces some caution 
on this conclusion.  Third, the heterogeneity in casualties may mean that Islamic terrorist 
attacks can have very different results, ranging from high to low levels of this effect. This is 
the main result of the paper, and the policy implication is that adequate prevention and 
deterrence measures should always be in place, since the consequences in terms of casualties 
threatens to reach staggering proportions. Finally, the asymmetric targeting of the Islamic 
attacks of the different European countries means that a common European policy towards 
this threat will be difficult to achieve. 
The September 11, 2001 and March 11, 2004 attacks reinforced the perception that 
radical Islamic terrorist events have changed in terms of scale, type of attacks and countries 
targeted. Such extraordinary acts of terrorism call for extraordinary policy responses, 
including undertaking stringent preventive action, such as the laws currently enforced. 
Nevertheless, in the long run, according to the data set, it seems that we may expect the low 
frequency of terrorist activity in Western Europe and North America to be maintained, 
similar to that observed throughout most of the period studied. This possibility, very clearly, 
cannot allow the authorities and citizens to indulge in any degree of complacency or to relax 
their vigilance. Policies and strategies to counteract the phenomenon need to be permanently 
in place. 
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ANNEX: ITERATE ISLAMIC GROUPS INCLUDED IN THE DATA 
 
0044  Islamic Guerrillas in America 
0047  Imperial Iranian Patriotic Organization 
2103  People's League of Free Palestine 
2224  Palestine Resistance 
2232  Committee for the Safeguard of the Islamic Revolution 
2243  Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle Eastern Political Prisoners 
3525  Palestinian Revenge Organization 
3803  Malmo Muslims  Jihad 
6149  Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Algeria) 
6154  Algerian Secret Service 
6156  Algerian Fundamentalists 
6157  Islamic Armed Group (Algeria) (GIA) 
6158  Algerian Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) 
6159  GIA - General Command (Algeria) 
6200  indeterminate Libyans 
6202  People of Omar 
6204  Libyan Agents 
6205  Green Brigades 
6206  National Front for the Salvation of Libya 
6207  Al Borkan  Volcano  Libyan Organization 
6209  Libyan Organization of 7 April 
6210  Libyan Revolutionary Committee 
6298  Iranian Exiles 
6301  indeterminate Iranian guerrillas 
6302  Iranian students 
6303  IPS  Peoples Strugglers Mujahiddin e Kha 
6306  Islamic Jihad Organization 
6309  Political Organization of the Arab People 
6316  Iranian National Liberation Movement-Red 
6317  Revolutionary Islamic Organization 
6318  Guards of Islam  Guard Corps of  Islam Group 
6320  Azadegan  Freedom Seekers  Iranian  monarchicals 
6321  Peykar  Muslim Protest 
6322  Feda iye Khalq  Mujaheddin e Khalq 
6324  Fedayen-e-Islam  led by Ayatollah Sadegh 
6327  Martyrs of the Islamic Revolution 
6328  Iranian intelligence agents 
6329  Islamic Revolutionary Movement 
6331  Hezbollah 
6332  indeterminate Shi’ite moslems 
6334  Fedayeen of the imperial Iranian monarchy 
6335  Martyrs of the Iranian Revolution 
6336  Sons of Imam al-Hoseyn ibn  Ali 
6337  Iranian Revolutionary Guard   20
6338  Iranian People's Fedayin Guerrillas 
6339  Guardians of the Islamic Revolution 
6341  Islamic Revolution Organization 
6397  The Western Thrace Islamists (Islamistas Dhitikis Thrakis) (Turkey) 
6446  Hawari Group (Pro Iraqi) (Iraq) 
6448  indeterminate Iraqi guerrillas 
6449  Iraqi Agents 
6455  Iraqi Mujahidin Islam 
6463  Iraqi Islamic Amal Organization 
6467  Organization of Iraqi Islamic Action 
6506  Vanguards of the Conquest (Egypt) (Talai al Fath) 
6509  The Muslim Group (al-Jama'a al klamiyah) (Islamic League of Those Applying the Book 
and the Sunnah) (Egypt) 
6521  Muslim Brotherhood 
6530  Syrian agents 
6533  Syrian Mujaheddin 
6624  Imam Musa as-Sadr Brigades  Imam as-Sadr 
6625  Movement of Arab Revolutionary Brigades 
6627  LARF  Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction 
6630  indeterminate Jordanian 
6640  Islamic Liberation Front 
6658  Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) (Palestinian) 
6659  Al Tawhid (Palestinian) 
6670  indeterminate Arab/Palestinian guerrillas 
6671  PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
6672  AOLP Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine 
6673  Al Fatah 
6674  BSO Black September 
6679  PFLP-GC  PFLP-General Command 
6686  PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization 
6695  Arab Liberation Front 
6700  Fatah Force 17 
6702  Palestinian Resistance Jaffa Squad (Palestine) 6706  Usama Bin Laden (Al-Qaeda) (The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and 
Crusaders) (Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites) 
6711  15 May Arab Organization 
6712  Fatah-Revolutionary Council  Abu Nidal Gr 
6713  Al Asifah  headed by Abu Nidal 
6714  Black June  headed by Abu Nidal 
6725  Group for Martyred  Islam as-Sartawi 
6726  Movement for Rebuilding Fatah 
6727  Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
6728  Revolutionary Organization of Socialist 
6729  Martyrs of Tal Zatar Organization 
6730  indeterminate Abu Nidal guerrillas 
6731  Liberation of Palestine 
6732  Secret Army for the Liberation of  Palestine 
6733  Arab Revolutionary Cells 
6734  Arab Revolutionary Front 
6735  PLF Palestine Liberation Front 
6739  Islamic Resistance Front 
6740  Martyrs of Palestine  Abu Nidal group 
6743  Abu Musa Organization 
6744  Arab Combatants 
6745  Organization of Islamic Justice 
6750  Union of Imams (Jordan - al Qaeda) 
6991  al Jame'ah of International Justice 
6995  The Basics of the Islam (Palestinian) 
6997  Ansar'e Hizballah (Iran led by Hossein Allah Karam) 
7001  People's Mojahedin of Afghanistan 
7505  Kashmir Liberation Army 
7513  Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 